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THE IMPACT OF AUTOMATED LITIGATION
SUPPORT SYSTEMS ON AN ATTORNEY'S
STANDARD OF CARE
I. INTRODUCTION
No amount of wishful thinking can slow the rapid pace of
technology or diminish its impact on every aspect of our daily
lives. The use of computers is becoming commonplace in
banking, manufacturing, medicine, government, education,
and even in the home. The legal profession has not remained
immune from this onslaught. Lawyers have discovered the
beneficial aspects of computer use, ranging from increased of-
fice efficiency to use as an aid in legal research. Courts will
now have to grapple with new problems such as the admis-
sability of computer generated evidence or the proprietary
rights of computer software.
Given this technological explosion, it is foreseeable that
at some point, failure to use a computer in a given industry or
profession will serve as the basis for a negligence claim.' The
author of this comment suggests that it would be appropriate
to impose a duty upon an attorney to use computerized litiga-
tion support where such use would enhance the attorney's
performance. This duty should exist even though such use has
not yet become standard practice throughout the legal profes-
sion. Trends in other areas of the law indicate that courts
have been willing to impose liability for failure to use state of
the art equipment even when such use is not customary.
In analyzing the imposition of this duty, this comment
will first note the current use of computerized litigation sup-
port and its importance to the legal profession. Secondly, it
will analyze the elements of a legal malpractice suit and dis-
c 1983 by Andrea Hirsch
1. Several commentators in different fields have noted the growing use of com-
puters and the effect that such use has on professional standards. See BENDER, COM-
PUTERS AND EVIDENCE LAW 4.06 (1982); S.L. HAYNES, CoMPTERS AND LITIGATION SuP-
PORT 39 n.1 (1981); Nycum, Legal Problems of Computer Abuse, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q.
527, 534; Rome & Rust, Computer Aid for the Small Law Office, 12 TRIAL, Aug. 1976,
at 39; Southwick, Computerized Litigation Support: When, What and How, 27 PRAC.
LAW., July 1981, at 77, 78.
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cuss how non-use of a computerized system could serve as the
basis for such a suit. It will then examine those cases where a
claim of negligence based on non-use of modern equipment
has been successful and evaluate the factors that influence
those decisions. Finally, the policy concerns of imposing pro-
fessional liability upon attorneys to use computer support will
be examined. In conclusion, this comment recommends that
liability for non-use of computerized litigation support should
be imposed in those cases where such support would enable
an attorney to provide more effective representation in his cli-
ent's behalf.
II. USE OF COMPUTERS IN LITIGATION MANAGEMENT
A. What is Automated Litigation Support?
Virtually all litigation, regardless of the size of the case,
requires some overall scheme by which the attorney prepares
for trial. The term "litigation support" refers to the design
and execution of a plan for managing the full range of activi-
ties required in litigation." Automated litigation support is the
addition of a computer to such a system.3
The common objectives of an automated litigation sup-
port system are: (1) the establishment of a central collection
of documents, (2) a means of providing access to a data base
in order to support effective trial preparation, (3) the use of
the data base as a primary source of input for drafting and
editing of briefs and other documents, and (4) the establish-
ment of a tool for the control of all aspects of the manage-
ment of the case. 4 There are two methods by which these
objectives can be obtained. First, the computer can be used
for full text recording. This involves transferring the entire
text of a document into the computer and directing the com-
puter to prepare its own index. Thus, when the attorney types
2. "Litigation support is a system of combining the activities of people with
machines and methods and associated resources for the acquisition, condensation,
manipulation, presentation and disposition in support of the practice of law." E.U.
KINNEY, LITIGATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS: AN ATrORNEY'S GUIDE 13 (1980).
3. There are numerous sources that describe automated litigation support sys-
tems. For a discussion of such systems see S.L. HAYNES, COMPUTERS AND LITIGATION
SUPPORT (1981); COMPUTERS IN LITIGATION SUPPORT (W. Cwiklo ed. 1979); J.H.
YOUNG, M.E. KmS & H.C. TRAINOR, USE OF COMPrrERs IN LITIGATION (1979).
4. Vovakis, Litigation File Management: Preparation for Trial, in COMPUTERS
IN LITIGATION SUPPORT 142 (W. Cwiklo ed. 1979).
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a word or words into the computer, the computer retrieves all
the documents that contain the desired word or words.
Document indexing is the second method of automated
litigation support. This requires that all the evidentiary
materials of a case be manually reviewed and indexed in some
manner so that they can be instantly retrieved by the com-
puter. An attorney's choice between full text recording or doc-
ument indexing will depend upon the characteristics of the
particular case.' An automated system, however, will never re-
place the experience and judgment of a trial lawyer.
The first litigation stage where automated litigation sup-
port becomes particularly useful is discovery. With regard to
production of documents, a computer can perform special
searches and group documents according to theories underly-
ing the litigation.6 Also, in determining whether additional
discovery is required, the computer can provide instant re-
trieval of relevant documents for the attorney.7 When inter-
rogatories need to be answered, a computer can provide inval-
uable assistance in locating pertinent information.'
Automated litigation support can also be helpful when deposi-
tions are being taken. For example, a computer can locate
those documents authored by, or received from, the individual
to be deposed and subsequently verify statements made at the
deposition by comparing those statements with those the per-
son has previously made. In addition, it can facilitate search-
ing deposition transcripts through use of the indexing
system.9
5. The primary advantage of full text recording is that when certain words are
critical to a case, they will not escape the computer's attention. However, in a case
with a large number of documents, an inquiry as to a certain word may produce too
many documents for an attorney to perform an effective search. In addition, because
of the use of slang or ambiguous phrases, an important document may be overlooked.
It also is more expensive to input all the data into the computer.
The document indexing approach has several distinct advantages. It promotes an
early organization of the case due to the required initial manual review. It eliminates
the dependence on words since human judgment is required for the process of data
input. Also, less material need be entered into the computer, thus lowering the cost.
See Rust & Rome, The Combination of a Manual and an Automated Approach to
Trial Preparation, in UsE OF COMPUTERS IN LITIGATION 107, 109-11 (1979).
6. Vovakis, supra note 4, at 142.
7. Goodrich, Lawyers' Consideration and Requirements for Systems Support
During Discovery, in COMPUTERS IN LITIGATION SUPPORT 41 (W. Cwiklo ed. 1979).
8. Id.
9. DuBowe, Automated Litigation Support: A Litigator's Primer, 68 A.B.A.J.
1118, 1119 (1982).
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The next stage of litigation, preparation for trial, can also
benefit from the utilization of an automated litigation support
system. The system can be used to develop sets of potential
trial exhibits, track documents as to their exhibit history,10 in-
dex legal memoranda and briefs by reference to the particular
points of law that they address," and assist in preparation of
witnesses and experts. 12
Automated litigation support also provides valuable assis-
tance during the trial itself. To begin with, it can index the
daily trial transcripts.3 It also can furnish a means for track-
ing trial exhibits and searching for specific documents men-
tioned by witnesses at trial. Furthermore, automated litiga-
tion support can extract relevant document summaries and
work product summaries, as well as other pieces of data to be
used in narrative statements, trial briefs, and arguments. 4 Fi-
nally, an automated litigation support system will preserve
the document file for appeal. 5
The benefits of automated litigation support systems are
numerous. Efficiency is the most obvious benefit. The system
can provide a reliable method of systematically handling any
significant volume of information. In complex cases's manual
10. Tracking documents as to their exhibit history refers to the ability of a com-
puterized system to record all evidence offered as exhibits at depositions and hearings
and maintain a record as to their status, i.e., when the exhibit was offered, with what
witness, whether it was objected to, and its possible use for trial. See Haynes, supra
note 3, at 589.
11. DuBowe, supra note 9, at 1121.
12. Vovakis, supra note 4, at 143-44.
13. A full trial transcript can be of enormous use in correlating evidence, recal-
ling statements made and evidence offered, referencing precise terminology used by
the court, and researching matters related to cross-examination or rebuttal. See
S.L.HAYNES, supra note 3, at 598.
14. Vovakis, supra note 4, at 143-44. See also Legal Automation News, Dec.
1982, at 7, col. 2, for a description of how one law firm utilized automated legal sup-
port at three different trials.
15. Halverson, Use of the Computer for Manipulating Information, in USE O
CoMPUtrEs IN LrroATION 83, 93 (1979).
16. The term complex cases refers to "[o]ne case or two or more related cases
which present unusual problems, and which require extraordinary treatment."
WEST'S MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LIGATION § 0.10 (1973). Some examples are: anti-
trust, common disaster cases, patent, trademark and copyright cases, products liabilty
cases, multiple or multidistrict litigation, and class actions. Sherman & Kinnard, The
Development, Discovery and Use of Computer Support Systems in Achieving Effi-
ciency in Litigation, 79 COLUM. L. Rav. 267, 268 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Sherman].
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handling of information is impossible.17 The ability of the
computer to instantly retrieve documents provides protection
against unanticipated developments. Moreover, if the case is
to extend over a long period of time, automated litigation sup-
port helps assure continuity.18
B. How to Decide if Automated Litigation Support is
Necessary
The legal profession has been slow in adopting computers
for use in litigation support.19 In today's complex cases, how-
ever, it is no longer feasible to use manual methods of han-
dling information.2 0 It is generally accepted that any litigation
involving over 10,000 documents will require some sort of au-
tomated litigation support system.21 Many commentators even
prefer to use the figure of 5,000 documents as the cut-off
point.22 However, the number of documents in a given case is
not necessarily determinative of whether automated litigation
support should be utilized or not.
Automated litigation support may be desirable for much
smaller litigation. The following factors should be considered:
1) The character of the litigation and the number
and complexity of the issues. If the issues are complex,
the computer can ascertain patterns among the docu-
ments produced.
2) The number of parties. If there are multiple
plaintiffs or defendants for which it is necessary to track
class members or compare interrogatory and deposition
responses, a computer can simplify this process.
3) The time involved in the litigation. On the one
hand, if the documents must be processed in a very short
time, computer use may be desirable. Or, if the litigation
17. E.U. KINNEY, supra note 2, at 4.
18. DuBowe, supra note 9, at 1119.
19. "Complex litigation has become an enormous horror story to law firms and
clients alike as cottage craft methods are applied to twentieth century litigation."
Turner, Systems Management and the Computer in Efficient and Effective Trial
Preparation, 28 FED'N. INS. CouNs. Q. 379, 383-84 (1977-78).
20. COMPUTERS IN LITIGATION SUPPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
21. Sherman, supra note 16, at 267.
22. See Brinton, The Use of Computers and Automated Retrieval Systems, 31
FED'N. INS. CoUNs. Q. 135, 135 (1980-81); DuBowe, supra note 9, at 1119; Halverson,
Coping with the Fruits of Discovery in the Complex Case, in COMPUTERS IN LITIGA-
TION SUPPORT 97 (W. Cwiklo ed. 1979); Sherman, supra note 16, at 267; Southwick,
supra note 1, at 78; Sweet, Love Thy Computer, BARRISTER, Summer 1982, at 16.
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is expected to stretch out over a long period of time, it
can be expected that more documents will be generated
and the computer can aid in dealing with the influx of
those new documents. In addition, it can facilitate the sit-
uation of attorneys leaving the case and new attorneys
coming onto the case.
4) The amount at stake. The amount in controversy
may justify the expense of being better organized and
more in control.
5) The importance of the case to the attorney and
the client.
6) What the other side is doing. If the other side is
using a computer, the attorney that continues to pursue
litigation by manual methods may find himself at a severe
disadvantage.23
No one factor is necessarily more important than another
in any given case. An attorney handling a small case is most
likely to be concerned with cost and therefore must carefully
analyze the importance of the case, both to himself and to his
client, to determine if the added expense of computerization
is justified and/or necessary.
C. Predictions for Increased Use
Five years ago, a trial lawyer would not have considered
using automated litigation support, unless it was a case of
massive proportions. Today, the use of automated litigation
support is a more viable concept. 4 This is due in part to the
growth of litigation. Attorneys are faced with more cases and
often a greater volume of relevant documents in a case. In ad-
dition the number of vendors of litigation support systems has
increased in recent years.2 5 As these vendors gain experience,
standardization of systems may result, thus providing attor-
neys with a greater predictability of cost of an automated sys-
tem e.2  Furthermore, as lawyers become more familiar with
computers, they may be encouraged to establish an in-house
computer and litigation support system which would lead to
23. Rosen & McCormick, The Computer as an Aid to the Litigator, in COM-
PUTERS IN LITIGATION SUPPORT 323 (W. Cwiklo ed. 1979).
24. Olson & Goodrich, Litigation Support Systems-Present Status and Fu-
ture Use, in COMPUTERS IN LITIGATION SUPPORT 153 (W. Cwiklo ed. 1979).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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more routine use of automated litigation support."
III. NON-USE OF AUTOMATED LITIGATION SUPPORT AS A
BASIS FOR A MALPRACTICE SUIT
A. Elements of the Legal Malpractice Claim28
The elements of a legal malpractice claim are identical to
those that constitute the prima facie case for ordinary negli-
gence: a duty of care owed to plaintiff by defendant, a breach
of that duty, and an actual injury or loss sustained by plaintiff
which was proximately caused by the breach.29
1. Standard of Care.
The difference between legal malpractice and ordinary
negligence is the standard by which an attorney's conduct is
judged. In ordinary negligence cases, the defendant must show
that he conformed to the standard of care expected of a "rea-
sonable man."30 In a legal malpractice action, the standard of
care is generally "that degree of care, skill, diligence and
knowledge commonly possessed and exercized by a reasonably
careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law .... "'
In determining whether an attorney conformed with the
standard of care required of him, a court will look to: (1)
whether the necessary skill and knowledge was exercised, (2)
whether the local considerations and customs were followed or
exceeded, and (3) whether the attorney has held himself out
as a specialist."2
27. Id. at 182.
28. In discussing the failure to use automated litigation support as the basis of
a malpractice claim, it is first necessary to realize that there is a recognition problem.
A client may not even be aware that his attorney's failure to use a computer could
serve as the basis of a valid malpractice suit. The increased use of computers may
serve to mitigate any recognition problem. The client himself may use computers in
his trade or business and expect that his attorney is also utilizing the modern tools of
the trade. In addition, if the other side uses a computer, the client may thus be aware
of computer use as providing a distinct advantage.
29. Peters & Robinson, The Elements of a Legal Malpractice Case Based on
Litigation Errors, 28 PRAC. LAW. Mar. 1982, at 53, 56.
30. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 (1971).
31. Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. H. P. Clausing, 438 P.2d 865, 866-67 (Wash.
1968) (citing Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954)). See also Theo-
bald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1961); 3 T. SHEARMAN & A.
REDFELD, NEGLIGENCE, 579 (C. Zipp, rev. ed. 1941).
32. R.E. MALLEN & V.B. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 318 (1981).
1983] 1137
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No single factor listed above is conclusive as to liability.
For the purpose of a legal malpractice claim, however, the sec-
ond factor is particularly important.8 Consideration of local
rules, practices or customs may help determine the propriety
of the attorney's conduct. In many instances computer use
will not be the custom of the legal profession in a particular
locality. Therefore, a defendant attorney might depend on
that absence of custom as a defense to the malpractice action.
However, while evidence of local practices or customs may be
relevant, courts generally assert that such evidence cannot be
used to reduce the standard of care and thus shield an attor-
ney from liability." Custom may in fact be found to be im-
proper, as was the case in Gleason v. Title Insurance Co.35 In
Gleason, the defendant attorney had been hired to examine
title to property. Instead of personally examining the public
records, he relied on information received over the telephone.
When the information that he relayed to the plaintiff was dis-
covered to be erroneous, the attorney claimed that he could
not be held liable for negligence since he had performed in the
customary manner. Rejecting this contention, the court stated
33. Courts in general have not applied a specialist standard of care to legal mal-
practice. A litigation attorney is not held to the standard of care as exemplified by
litigation attorneys but just that of a general practitioner. There is a minority line of
cases, however, that support the proposition that a lawyer who holds himself out as a
specialist subjects himself to the standard of care exercised by other lawyers practic-
ing in the same specialty. See Childs v. Comstock, 74 N.Y.S. 643 (1902); Wright v.
Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975).
As official recognition of specialization in certain areas of the law increases, it is
likely that a stricter standard of the care expected of specialists will evolve. It has
been suggested that certification standards for trial advocates be adopted which
would have the effect of classifying litigation attorneys as specialists. Koskoff, Spe-
cialization: Certification Standards for Trial Advocates, 13 TRIAL June 1977, at 36.
Should that occur, a client who hired an attorney for litigation purposes could reason-
ably expect that attorney to possess a higher degree of knowledge and skill than a
general practitioner of law. Such a development might affect a litigation attorney's
duty to utilize computer support. See generally Friend & Hartzler, New Develop-
ments in Legal Malpractice, 26 AM. U.L. Rv. 408, 414 (1976-77); Peters & Robinson,
supra note 29, at 57-58; Schnidman & Salzler, The Legal Malpractice Dilemma: Will
New Standards of Care Place Professional Liability Beyond the Reach of the Spe-
cialist, 45 CN. L. Rzv. 541, 47-50 (1976).
. 34. Local practices or custom may be used to determine the minimum standard
of care required of an attorney; for example, an attorney should be familiar with local
statutes and ordinances. See Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Civ. App. 1966).
However, these local practices and customs are only relevant with regard to the
knowledge required, not to the degree of skill and prudence required, which should be
uniform. See R.E. MALLEN & V.B. LEvrr, supra note 32, at 332-39 (1981).
35. 300 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1962).
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that " [w]hile custom provides an important indication of what
constitutes reasonable care and what is negligent, it is not dis-
positive of the question at issue." 6
2. Breach
Once plaintiff has established the standard of care re-
quired, he must show that the defendant attorney breached
that standard. The type of litigation error that is most likely
to provide a successful basis for a suit based on an attorney's
failure to use automated litigation support is one where the
attorney's mistake does not involve an error in judgment.
Failure to win a case does not indicate that the attorney did
not possess the requisite skill and knowledge. 7 Attorneys will
not be held liable for judgments made in good faith 8 or for
the utilization of trial strategies that differ from those of an-
other attorney.3e For example, plaintiffs have not been suc-
cessful when they allege negligence on the basis of the attor-
ney's failure to introduce certain evidence or witnesses in the
course of a trial.40
If the plaintiff can show, however, that the attorney's er-
ror was not based on a tactical decision, the court may be will-
ing to find the attorney liable for negligence. 1 In a suit based
36. Id. at 814.
37. See Gimbel v. Waldman, 193 Misc. 758, 761, 84 N.Y.S. 2d 888, 891 (1948);
Priest v. Dodsworth, 235 Ill. 613, 617, 85 N.E. 940, 942 (1908); Harriman v. Baird, 39
N.Y.S. 592, 593 (1896); Babbit v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, 337, 41 N.W. 417, 418
(1889); Seymour v. Cagger, N.Y. Sup. Ct. 29, 33 (1878).
38. Plamer v. Nissen, 256 F. Supp. 497, 501 (D. Maine 1966); Martin v. Burns,
102 Ariz. 341, 343, 429 P.2d 660, 662 (1967); Meagher v. Kavli, 256 Minn. 54, 60-61,
97 N.W.2d 370, 375 (1959).
39. See Lynn v. Lynn, 4 Wash. App. 171, 480 P.2d 789 (1971) where the court
held that the test is: "[aifter considering the entire record, was the complaining party
afforded a fair trial?" Id. at 175, 480 P.2d at 792. See also Stricklen v. Koella, 546
S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).
40. See Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 Ill. App. 2d 235, 194 N.E.2d 489 (1963).
The court held that it would not interfere with the attorney's decision regarding
those witnesses to be put on the stand.
In other cases plaintiffs have been unsuccessful because it has been shown that in
fact the attorney's decision was correct. See Johnson v. Amer. Life Ins. Co., 237 Ala.
70, 185 So. 409 (Ala. 1938) where the court found that plaintiff's allegation with re-
gard to defendant having excused an important witness was not supported by the
evidence. See also Case v. Ricketts, 41 A.2d 304-05 (D.C. 1945) (the court found the
evidence "would probably have had a damaging effect" to plaintiff's case).
41. See Lewis v. Collins, 260 So. 2d 357 (La. Ct. App. 1972). The court found
defendant attorney negligent for failing to obtain and present records which he knew
were available and necessary to present plaintiff's case favorably. The case was re-
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
on the failure to use automated litigation support, the plain-
tiff must first show that the attorney committed a litigation
error. Examples of such litigation errors include claims that
an attorney failed to find key documents, overlooked an im-
peaching statement made by a witness, or produced confiden-
tial documents during discovery.
After showing the litigation error, the plaintiff then must
establish that the attorney's error was negligent, thus consti-
tuting a breach of the duty of care. To establish this element,
plaintiff may need expert witnesses to testify as to the proper
course of action; for example, whether omitted evidence was
admissible, or that the inadvertently produced documents
were in fact confidential. The expert witness would also testify
as to whether it would have been reasonable or tactically
sound for an attorney to have acted in the manner of the de-
fendant attorney.42
3. Causation
In a legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff must next
demonstrate that a causal connection existed between the al-
leged breach and his injury. This causation requirement is the
most difficult element in a legal malpractice claim to substan-
tiate. It is said that a plaintiff must prove "a suit within a
suit," or two separate lawsuits.4" By examining this "suit
within a suit" burden, the causation requirements for litiga-
tion involving automated litigation support are better
understood.
In the first phase of the suit, the plaintiff must show a
causal connection between the attorney's failure to use auto-
mated litigation support and the injury. The majority rule is
that plaintiff must establish that the defendant's negligence
was the proximate cause of loss." There is evidence of a
manded because the court was unable to rule whether presentation of the evidence
would have ensured a successful result to the plaintiff. Id. at 360.
42. See Sanders v. Smith, 83 N.M. 706, 496 P.2d 1102 (1972). Defendant attor-
ney obtained the affidavits of three other attorneys attesting that he had not been
negligent. Plaintiff failed to present any expert witnesses of his own to support his
allegations of negligence. The court found that there was no question of fact as to the
attorney's negligence. Id. at 708, 496 P.2d at 1104.
43. See generally D.J. MEISELMAN, ATrORNEY MALPRAcTIcE: LAW AND PROCE-
DURE (1980); Friend & Hartzler, supra note 33, at 433-34; Peters & Robinson, supra
note 29, at 60-61.
44. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1916); Christy
1140 [Vol. 23
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recetn trend, however, that requires only that plaintiff show
that the attorney's act or omission was a proximate cause of
the injury." Thus, the plaintiff would only have to prove that
the alleged litigation error was a substantial factor in the un-
favorable judgment and that proper use of automated litiga-
tion support would have ensured that the mistake would not
have occurred.
The plaintiff may have to introduce evidence that the
number of documents alone prevented the attorney from ef-
fectively being able to do a thorough manual review, thus ne-
cessitating computer use. Or, plaintiff may contend that due
to the complexity of issues involved, the attorney could not
perform analyses that were critical to a thorough understand-
ing of the case without the aid of a computer. It may be per-
suasive simply to show that the winning side did use auto-
mated litigation support."
In the second phase of the suit, the plaintiff must prove
that his underlying claim was valid.7 Plaintiff must establish
the validity of his claim by showing that a favorable judgment
would have resulted "but for" the attorney's negligent con-
duct."8 For example, where plaintiff has alleged that the attor-
ney's non-use of automated litigation support caused certain
evidence to be overlooked, or improperly disclosed, he must
also prove that but for that act or omission he would have
obtained a favorable result in the original action.
The law is unsettled regarding the burden of proof re-
quired to prove causation. In some jurisdictions, the court will
v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 294 (1970); McGregor v. Wright,
117 Cal. App. 186, 196, 3 P.2d 624, 628 (1931). The degree of proof required is a
preponderance of the evidence. If the defendant can establish that some other cause
could have played a part in causing plaintiff's injury, he will not be held liable. See
Collins v. Slocum, 317 So. 2d 672, 680 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Brown v. Gitlin, 19 II.
App. 3d 1018, 1020, 313 N.E.2d 180, 182 (1974).
45. See Cline v. Watkins, 66 Cal. App. 3d 174, 178, 135 Cal. Rptr. 838, 840
(1977); Starr v. Moslin, 14 Cal. App. 3d 988, 1002, 92 Cal. Rptr. 583, 591 (1971);
Ishmael v. Midlington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 598 (1966); Mod-
ica v. Christ, 129 Cal. App. 2d 144, 146, 276 P.2d 614, 615 (1954); Collins v. Green-
stein, 61 Hawaii 26, 41, 595 P.2d 275, 284 (1979); Gustavson v. O'Brien, 87 Wis. 2d
193, 199, 274 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1979).
46. See S.L. HAYNES, supra note 3, at 38 n.1.
47. Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Better
Homes Inc. v. Rogers, 195 F. Supp. 93, 95 (N.D. W. Va. 1961).
48. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1916); Better
Homes Inc. v. Rogers, 195 F. Supp. 93, 95 (N.D. W. Va. 1961); Sherry v. Diercks, 29
Wash. App. 433, 438, 628 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1981).
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require that the plaintiff establish with certainty, that had it
not been for the attorney's failure to use automated litigation
support, a different and more favorable result would have
been achieved. ' e Recently, however, courts have acknowledged
that the certainty requirement places too great a burden upon
a plaintiff. The requirement has been viewed as an almost im-
possible barrier for plaintiff to overcome, thus insulating at-
torneys from liability. These courts have been willing to adopt
a more lenient test.
In Lysick v. Walcom so the court held that the plaintiff
need only establish "a reasonable basis for the conclusion that
it was more likely than not, that the conduct of the defendant
was a substantial factor in the result.151 Similarly, in Smith v.
Lewis52 the court found that plaintiff's negligence claim
against his attorney was valid even though it was not certain
that plaintiff would have obtained a favorable result in the
original action. The test adopted by the court was whether
defendant's action caused the plaintiff to suffer a loss of
opportunity.58
It can be argued that Smith places too great a burden on
the attorney and that the plaintiff should have to show a loss
of a substantial opportunity. This was the test adopted by the
court in Hicks v. United States" Hicks is a medical malprac-
tice case but it has been suggested that the courts adopt this
new medical standard test in legal malpractice cases because
the "certainty" test is too harsh."
49. Better Homes Inc. v. Rogers, 195 F. Supp. at 95; Campbell v. Magana, 184
Cal. App. 2d 751, 754, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32, 33 (1960); Lally v. Custer, 177 Cal. 783, 787-88,
171 P. 961, 962 (1918); Coon v. Ginsberg, 32 Colo. App. 206, 210, 509 P.2d 1293, 1295
(1973); Tassin v. Labranche, 365 So. 2d 31, 32 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
50. 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
51. Id. at 153, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
52. 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975), rev'd, 15 Cal. 3d 851
(1976) (case was reversed on a different issue than that addressed in this comment).
53. In Smith the plaintiff had alleged that defendant had been negligent in fail-
ing to assert her community interests in certain of her husband's retirement benefits
in her divorce proceedings. The court found that the defendant had been negligent in
failing to sufficiently research the issue although it was far from certain that he would
have prevailed. Id. at 360, 530 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
54. 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966). Plaintiff alleged death of decedent due to the
doctor's negligence. The court held that "If there was any substantial possibility of
survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable. Rarely is it possible to
demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have happened in circumstances
that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to pass." Id. at 632.
55. Jensen, The Standard of Proof of Causation in Legal Malpractice Cases, 63
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Therefore, if the court is willing to adopt a lesser stan-
dard of proof, plaintiff's task will be eased considerably.
Plaintiff will have to meet a two prong test: proof that the
attorney's failure to present favorable or essential evidence
was due in part to the non-use of automated litigation support
and then that such evidence indicates that he had a substan-
tial (although not necessarily unflawed) claim in the underly-
ing action. Where plaintiff can meet that test and show dam-
ages,56 the case is strong for imposing liability for failure to
use automated litigation support.
B. Duty to Use Automated Litigation Support
1. T.J. Hooper and Liability for Non-Use of Modern
Technology
The question then arises as to whether a court will be
willing to impose a duty on an attorney to use such recent
technology as automated litigation support when such use is
not accepted as standard practice in the legal profession. Au-
tomated litigation support may in fact be standard practice in
complex litigation cases which generate a tremendous number
of documents. However, the issue is unlikely to arise in such
cases because undoubtedly both sides are already utilizing
computer support. Complex litigation usually involves large
corporate interests, institutions, and the government which
have adequate wealth to support the expense of computerized
support.57
There is precedent, however, for liability to be imposed
even where computer use is not customary. This precedent
can be found in other professional malpractice and negligence
CORNELL L. REV. 666 (1978).
56. In order to be successful in a legal malpractice action, plaintiff must be able
to show actual damages sustained. Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d at 754, 8
Cal. Rptr. at 33; Capital Bank and Trust Co. v. Core, 343 So. 2d 284, 288 (La. Ct.
App. 1977). Thus, without actual injury caused by an attorney's failure to use auto-
mated litigation support, there would be no recovery for a plaintiff.
The general rule is that plaintiff may recover damages which are a direct result
of the attorney's negligence. Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 489, 269 P.2d
78, 79 (1954); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 520, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1954). The
value of the lost claim, that is, the amount that would have been recovered but for
the attorney's negligence, is the accepted measure of damages. Williams v. Bashman,
457 F. Supp. 322, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Freeman v. Rubin, 318 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1975).
57. Rosen, supra note 23, at 323-33.
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cases where courts have been willing to impose a duty to use
state of the art technology even though it is not yet general
custom to do so.
The leading case with regard to this issue is T.J.
Hooper. In that case several tugs were towing barges that
subsequently were damaged when they were lost in a storm.
The Hooper court addressed the issue of whether the tugs'
owners had a duty to have working radio receiving sets aboard
by which they could have gotten warning of the change in
weather and sought shelter. Although it was not general cus-
tom among the carriers to have radio sets," the court held the
tug owners liable for failing to so equip their tugs. The court
reasoned that:
There are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the
general practice of the calling the standard of proper dili-
gence .... Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is
in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its mea-
sure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adop-
tion of new and available devices. It may never set its own
tests .... Courts must in the end say what is required;
there are precautions so imperative that even their uni-
versal disregard will not excuse their omission .... s0
In deciding to impose liability on the tug owners, the
court considered the availability and reliability of radio, the
minimization of risk due to the use of radio, and the reasona-
bleness of the cost compared to the benefit received. 1 T.J.
Hooper establishes that an individual can be found negligent
for failing to utilize available technology despite the fact that
such use is not standard industry practice.
The development of radar posed a similar problem for the
courts. In Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co.6 the
plaintiff had purchased planes that were manufactured by the
defendant. When one of the planes was involved in a crash,
plaintiff alleged that there was a defect in the plane. Defen-
dant then alleged contributory negligence on the ground that
plaintiff had failed to equip the plane with proper radar
58. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
59. The court made a factual finding that the coastal carriers did not equip
their vessels with radio. Id. at 739.
60. Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
61. Id at 739-40.
62. 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955).
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equipment. The court found that at the time of the crash, no
American airline had airborne radar in operational use and
thus did not find plaintiff liable for contributory negligence."
The court emphasized, however, that it was the lack of availa-
bility of radar and not what was the customary practice of
other airlines which determined plaintiff's liability." Had ra-
dar been available at a reasonable cost, it seems likely that
liability for failure to use radar would have resulted regardless
of the fact that such use was not yet custmary practice.
The issue arose again in Afran Transport Co. v. The
Bergechief" which also involved a plane collision. In this case,
both aircraft involved were equipped with radar. The plaintiff
alleged that the captain of The Bergechief plane failed to
properly use his radar. In addition to ruling that the captain
had been negligent, the court noted that the duty of the own-
er of a vessel to equip such vessel with radar was still an un-
settled question. The court expressed its opinion, however,
that a rule requiring radar would soon be formulated."
These cases provide a strong argument for imposing lia-
bility for non-use of available technology regardless of indus-
try custom. Of course the analogy between the use of radar
and use of automated litigation support may seem somewhat
tenuous. The use of radio or radar provides a benefit that
humans cannot duplicate. A computer merely allows humans
to operate more efficiently. Nonetheless, these cases evidence
a willingness on the part of the judicial system to acknowledge
new technology and change the standard of care in accordance
with such new technology.
2. Medical Malpractice and Non-Use of Modern
Technology
Another key area where technological change has forced
the courts to re-evaluate the appropriate standard of care is in
medical malpractice cases. Physicians and attorneys are sub-
63. Id. at 129.
64. Id. "The fact that Northwest conformed to the practice of other airlines in
failing to equip No. 44 with radar did not establish its exercise of ordinary care as a
matter of law. Customary practice is not ordinary care; it is but evidence of ordinary
care." Id.
65. 274 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1960).
66. "Though the question is not before us. . . the question arises in limine as
to the duty of a vessel to carry radar .... Lurking in the background is T.J. Hooper
.... We think this case shows the way the wind blows. ... Id. at 474.
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ject to a similar standard of professional care;17 physicians
must observe the same degree of care as would "an average,
competent practitioner acting in the same or similar circum-
stances."68 Since the practice of medicine is constantly being
enhanced by new technology, the standard of care for physi-
cians is constantly evolving. 9
The effect of T.J. Hooper can be seen in those medical
malpractice cases where the court has looked beyond what is
customary practice to impose liability upon a physician. The
leading case in this area is Helling v. Carey"' where the court
acknowledged the Hooper holding as a controlling principle.
In Helling the plaintiff alleged that her physician was negli-
gent for failure to administer a glaucoma test. This alleged
negligence resulted in permanent visual damage to plaintiff.
7 1
Her physician contended that it was not standard practice
among opthalmologists to administer glaucoma tests to per-
sons like plaintiff.7 Relying on T.J. Hooper, the court found
the physician negligent. The court reasoned that the precau-
tion of giving a glaucoma test, regardless of the plaintiff's age,
was "so imperative that irrespective of its disregard by the
standards of the opthalmology profession" liability must
exist.78
Helling represents a major departure from the traditional
approach to medical malpractice. 4 If Helling is followed, it
raises the possibility that doctors and hospitals could be
found negligent for the failure to purchase or use computers,
even when such computer use is not standard practice. 5
The impact of the Helling/Hooper analysis can be seen in
67. Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 150, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 865-66
(1961); Slade v. Harris, 135 A. 570, 572 (Conn. 1927); Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App.
457, 475 (1934); Citizens' Loan Fund and Savings Assn. of Bloomington v. Friedley,
23 N.E. 1075 (Ind. 1890).
68. Clark v. U.S., 402 F.2d 950, 952 (4th Cir. 1968).
69. See Freed, Legal Aspects of Computer Use in Medicine, 32 LAW CONTEMP.
PRoBs. 674, 681 (1967). A physician has an obligation to keep abreast of advances
made in the profession and to utilize the latest methods and practice.
70. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
71. Id. at 515, 519 P.2d at 981.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 516, 519 P.2d at 983.
74. Traditionally, if a doctor does what other competent doctors in the locality
do in similar situations, he will not be liable for malpractice. Petras, Computers,
Medical Malpractice and the Ghost of the T.J. Hooper, 5 RUTGERs J. Comp. & L. 15,
16 (1975).
75. Id. at 17.
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several recent cases involving the duty of a physician to in-
form his patient about the diagnostic technique of
amniocentesis.7
In Johnson v. Yeshiva University," the court refused to
impose liability upon the physician for failure to perform
amniocentesis on grounds that his conduct was "a permissible
exercise of medical judgment and not a departure from then
accepted medical practice. 78 That court was apparently con-
tent to accept custom as a determinative factor. In Karlson v.
Guerinot79 however, the court imposed liability upon a physi-
cian for failure to perform amniocentesis. In that case the fact
that the mother's history indicated the birth of a previously
deformed child provided an imperative need for the test to be
performed. Finally, in Call v. Kezarian8 the court held that
"an attending physician is under a duty when treating a mid-
dle-aged woman to test for Down's Syndrome."' In this case,
defendant maintained that at the time of the pregnancy,
amniocentesis was not a common routine procedure, but
rather "at the frontiers of medical knowledge."82
Despite disagreement as to customary practice in regard
to the performance of amniocentesis, these cases illustrate
that some courts felt that the medical necessities of the proce-
dure outweighed any arguments that non-use was standard
procedure.
When analogizing medical malpractice cases to the issue
of computer use in the legal profession, one must realize that
technology plays a different role in medical diagnoses and
76. Amniocentesis is a method of genetic screening that is generally recom-
mended by physicians for pregnancies where the patient is older or there is a family
history of Down's Syndrome (mongolism). It was developed in the 1930's, but was not
commonly accepted until 1970. There still appear to be problems with the accuracy of
test results however, in part due to the overburdening of laboratory services. Haley,
Amniocentesis and the Apotheosis of Human Quality Control, 2 J. oF LEGAL MED.
348, 352 (1981).
77. 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340 (1977).
78. Id. at 818, 364 N.E.2d at 1340.
79. 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct. 1977). In' Karlson the court imposed liability
upon the defendant doctor who failed to inform the plaintiffs of the use of amni-
ocentesis to diagnose their child's condition. See also Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421,
404 A.2d 8, 11 (1979) (failure to inform of amniocentesis procedure constituted depar-
ture from acceptable medical practice).
80. 135 Cal. App. 3d 189, 185 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1982).
81. Id. at 193, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
82. Call v. Kezarian, L.A. Daily Journal, Aug. 20, 1982, at 1, col. 2 (decided Aug.
11, 1982).
1983] 1147
1148 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
treatment than in litigation. Technological development in
medicine enables a physician to make diagnoses that he could
not previously make and to treat illnesses in a new and more
effective manner. Medicine is an objective, scientific profes-
sion and non-use of modern technology can have a clear cut
detrimental result. In contrast, use of automated litigation
support will not necessarily guarantee a favorable outcome in
litigation. Automated litigation support merely provides a
more efficient system to prepare for trial; it is not meant to
act as a replacement for the attorney's judgment or
experience.
But the analogy should not be dismissed solely because
the use of automated litigation support may not be as critical
to the result of litigation. Both the legal and medical profes-
sions stress the importance of a high standard of care.8 The
medical malpractice cases indicate that the standard of medi-
cal care is adapting to changes in technology. Surely it is just
as important for the legal profession to accept a change in the
standard of care in response to changes in technology.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPOSING LIABILITY FOR NON-USE
OF AUTOMATED LITIGATION SUPPORT
The likelihood exists that in certain circumstances an at-
torney could be found liable for failure to use automated liti-
gation support. If the court determines the appropriate stan-
dard of care by looking to the skills and care of a prudent
attorney in similar circumstances, then liability is likely to be
imposed only in those very complex cases that involve a mas-
sive document file. In smaller cases, however, automated liti-
gation support is unlikely to be general custom; thus, unless a
court is willing to accept the Hooper/Helling analysis, there
will be no liability for the attorney involved. This comment
suggests that the Hooper/Helling analysis should be adopted
as a rationale for finding an attorney liable for failure to util-
ize computer support when such use is deemed appropriate
and/or necessary.
83. Freed, supra note 69, at 681; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY
Canon 6, EC-2 (1980).
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A. Evaluation of Factors Supporting Liability for Non-Use
Future decisions to impose liability for non-use of com-
puters in litigation support will be made on a case by case
basis, yet certain factors can be singled out for the court's
evaluation of the need or desire to impose liability.
In T.J. Hooper the court asserted specific factors for im-
posing liability on the tug owners. Those considerations can
be applied to the question of when it is reasonable to impose a
duty to use automated litigation support that is not as yet
generally accepted as standard practice by the legal profes-
sion. The factors include: (1) whether automated litigation
support systems are available, (2) whether automated litiga-
tion support is available at a reasonable cost, (3) whether au-
tomated litigation support is being used to minimize or reduce
an extraordinary risk, and (4) whether the absence of auto-
mated litigation support was a direct cause of the injury.
1. Availability
There is no question that automated litigation support
systems are generally available to any attorney who wishes to
utilize them. One survey indicates that 83% of the law firms
surveyed had used electronic data processing in litigation.,4
Another survey states that "a good share of all the lawyers
engaged in litigation in the U.S. have taken advantage of some
form of computer assisted litigation support."8 Numerous ar-
ticles and books instruct attorneys as to the use of automated
litigation support systems and where to obtain them.86 It is
not even necessary that an attorney have a working knowledge
of computers because there are vendors of computerized liti-
gation support systems that will design and install the system.
Automated litigation support is far from being a device that is
in the experimental stage; it is available and can be success-
fully used by any attorney that desires to do so.
2. Cost
Automated litigation support is fairly costly to utilize.8 7
84. Arthur, The Computer and the Practice of Law: Litigation Support in
COMPUTERS IN LITIGATION SUPPORT 295 (W. Cwiklo ed. 1979).
85. Brinton, supra note 22, at 146.
86. See generally S.L. HAYNES, supra note 3; E.U. KINNEY, supra note 2; Litiga-
tion Support Directory, 68 A.B.A.J. 1126-27 (1982).
87. An estimated cost for a case involving 5000 documents at the start with an
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However, the use of computers for litigation support is due to
a need for increased information and efficiency and not neces-
sarily for lowering costs.88 The principle cost involved is the
preparation needed to put data into the computer system. Ini-
tially it may take longer and cost more to input data than it
would take for an attorney or support staff to manually review
documents. But that expense may be worthwhile at some later
point when the computer performs a document search in a
fraction of the time that manual retrieval would require. 9
Furthermore, as systems use becomes more widespread,
the cost is likely to decrease. One author has made the predic-
tion that within the decade, law firms will find it cost effective
to automate cases involving as few as one thousand docu-
ments.90 Also, as use increases, there may be greater standard-
ization of systems, thus lowering the cost to the user.
3. Minimization of Extraordinary Risk
So far the factors discussed are valid considerations when
applied in the context of computer use in litigation. Given the
difference, however, between a legal malpractice action and a
negligence or medical malpractice case, an extraordinary risk
will generally not be involved in a legal malpractice claim. As
already discussed, radio and radar have the capability to actu-
ally prevent an accident. New advances in medicine allow for
greater accuracy in diagnosis and treatment. Law, at least in
civil litigation, does not involve that type of potential life or
death situation.
Perhaps because computer use in litigation does not in-
volve minimization of an extraordinary risk, courts will feel
that the Hooper/Helling analysis should not apply. Yet, litiga-
tion, like medical diagnosis or treatment is result oriented; al-
though life is not at stake, winning is. Thus, to a client who
has invested time and money, winning may seem as critical as
a life or death situation.
additional 6000 documents input over the course of one year was $34,000-$59,000.
Olson & Goodrich, supra note 24, at 155-71. The cost estimate for a manual system
has been calculated to be $25,000-$39,000, depending on the personnel cost. Id. at
171. See also Halverson, supra note 22, at 97 n.1.
88. Nelson, The Impact of Computers on the Legal Profession, 30 BAYLOR L.
REV. 829, 833-34 (1978).
89. Olson & Goodrich, supra note 24, at 170-71.
90. Walshe, Law Office Automation: Tying Systems Together, 69 A.B.A. J. 184
(1983).
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Moreover, automated litigation support does reduce or
minimize a risk. If a case involves large numbers of documents
or parties, or very complex issues, computer use may make it
more likely that the attorney's analysis can be more thorough
and efficient. Computer use can be viewed as imperative be-
cause non-use makes the risk of losing greater. Thus, auto-
mated litigation support does reduce or minimize a risk.
4. Injury Caused by Non-Use
The final factor to be evaluated is whether non-use of au-
tomated litigation support caused the injury. As already dis-
cussed, this is an element that is necessary to prove the prima
facie case for legal malpractice."' If the plaintiff cannot show
that the attorney's failure to use a computer was a proximate
cause of his injury, then he cannot win.
B. Policy Consideration
Whether or not liabilty should be imposed for failure to
use automated litigation support where it is not the general
practice is an issue that has important public policy consider-
ations as well as legal considerations.
Because automated litigation support is initially expen-
sive to install, there is a problem of equal accessibility of such
systems to all attorneys. Courts may be reluctant to impose
the duty of using computer support when the cost appears too
great for the attorney to bear. There are, however, suggestions
as to how to reduce the cost problem. One suggestion is that
the courts establish facilities for the computerization of cases
to be tried in their jurisdiction, at cost to the parties in-
volved." Although the initial cost to the courts would be high,
this would ensure that both parties to a lawsuit had equal ac-
cess to a computer. Another idea for making automated litiga-
tion support available to smaller firms is that of sharing a
computer system with the other side in the lawsuit;93 or, if
that is not feasible, several smaller firms might join together
in sharing a system. A small firm could also explore the possi-
bility of utilizing the computer system of a larger firm that
91. See supra text accompanying notes 43-56.
92. Rosen, supra note 23, at 322.
93. Rome & Rust, Computer Aid for the Small Law Office, 12 TfuAL Aug. 1976,
at 39, 40.
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has an in-house system." Yet another suggestion is that of
trying to recover the expenses of systems support under a
statute that authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees."
Notwithstanding the expense involved, there are several
important policy considerations that support imposing liabil-
ity. First and foremost, technological development should be
encouraged, not stifled. Judicial support of computer use is
essential to help combat inertia and resistance to change. The
courts have already been faced with a need to re-evaluate the
present law as to its validity in this new computer age. One
example of this involves the admissibility of computer evi-
dence.9' It was argued that when business records were en-
tered into and printed out by a computer, those computer
print-outs were not original records as required by the rules of
discovery. The courts have made it clear that computer print-
outs are admissible as business records. 7 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 34 was amended in 1970 so that "data compila-
tions" are now included in the listing of discoverable
materials. 8
Courts have also acknowledged the extensive use of com-
puters in such specific industries as banking. In Digitrex v. J.
Howard Johnson Co.,99 the court invalidated a New York
banking law that required restraining orders to be served on
the particular bank where a depositor's account was main-
tained. It reasoned that due to the use of computers, a bank
could monitor checking accounts from its main office and each
branch bank need no longer be considered a separate business
entity. The court took judicial notice of the fact that all major
commercial banks now are computerized. 00
A second policy consideration is that as sophistication of
94. Nelson, supra note 88, at 834.
95. Lewis, Closing Remarks and Questions, in COMPUTERS IN LTIGATION SUP-
PORT 77 (W. Cwiklo ed. 1979).
96. E.g., King v. State of Mississippi, 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969); Adams v. Dan
River Mills, 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1275 (W.D. Va. 1972).
97. The rules of evidence governing the admission of business records are of
common law origin and have evolved case by case, and the Court should apply these
rules consistent with the realities of current business methods. "The law always...
adjusts its rules to accommodate itself to the advancements of the age which it serves
.... 222 So. 2d 393 at 397. See also Adams, 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at
1276.
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
99. 491 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. N.Y. 1980.
100. Id. at 68.
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systems develops, considerations as to cost, capability and
performance will cease to be as limiting as they are presently
perceived to be.101 Furthermore, computers can vastly increase
the power of attorneys to manage litigation more thoroughly,
and therefore, provide a benefit to all concerned. Considering
the increase in litigation in the past few years, any method of
making it more manageable should be viewed favorably. Fi-
nally, there is the practical consideration that business
records are increasingly being maintained in computerized
form and discovery will consist of retrieving information from
the other side's computer and not from its warehouse. If the
attorney also has a computer system available, the informa-
tion is more readily processable. 0 1
It is also useful to consider the possible results of non-use
of a computer in litigation support. These include the possi-
bility that some work will not get done due to the manual
tasks consuming all available time; or, perhaps the attorney
will be less motivated to explore the additional or alternate
efforts that could have been employed through the computer's
ability to perform special searches or data analyses.103
V. CONCLUSION
The question of imposing liability for non-use of com-
puters is one that will arise in many different contexts in the
near future. Liability for non-use of automated litigation sup-
port systems is merely one facet of the larger question: when
should the courts recognize a need to change the accepted
duty of care to conform to changes in technology.
The courts have readily accepted the increasingly impor-
tant role that computers play in society today. Recent cases
suggest a willingness on their part to find non-use of technol-
ogy to be evidence of negligence even when such non-use is
the accepted custom. The considerations that dictated a find-
ing of negligence in Hooper and Helling are equally applicable
to a finding of liability when an attorney neglects to use auto-
mated litigation support in litigation where such use would be
valuable.
The technology is available for lawyers to improve the
101. Lewis, supra note 95, at 4, 5.
102. Id.
103. E.U. KINNEY, supra note 2, at 26.
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services that they render their clients in litigation. Once law-
yers become accustomed to the idea of using computers for
litigation support, use will increase dramatically. Hopefully,
attorneys will discover the immense advantages of using auto-
mated litigation support systems without the necessity of a
court ruling that such is an attorney's duty. However, if it is
necessary for a court to rule on the matter, the time is ripe.
Automated litigation support is commercially available to
all those desiring to use it. The initial cost may be well worth
subsequent savings in time, labor and efficiency. Automated
litigation support increases an attorney's competence and
level of performance, thus benefitting both the attorney and
his client. All of the necessary elements are present for a find-
ing that an attorney has a duty to employ a computer in liti-
gation support.
Andrea Hirsch
